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know the grantee. The attorney's standard of conduct would probably also require clarification, since in Malone v.Gerth, an action by a
client against his attorney, a somewhat variable test was proposed:
If an attorney is fairly capacitated to discharge the duties ordinarily incumbent upon one of his profession, and acts with a
proper degree of attention and with reasonable care, and to the
and knowledge, he will not be responsible. [Embest of his skill
27
phasis added]

Once a court removes the requirement of privity for tort liability
or adopts a liberal view of third-party beneficiary doctrine, only the case
by case method of determining the limits of liability for attorneys, and
other professions, will allow one to state the law with any amount of
certainty. Lawyers may protest this increased imposition of liability,
attorney liability insurance may increase both in rates and coverage, but
the possible value to the profession, if attorneys are aware of this
greater liability, is an advantage to the profession which should not be
quickly dismissed.
At present it would be too speculative to predict whether the California attorney 1.) will exercise a greater degree of care or 2.) show
restraint in adopting new methods 28 or 3.) continue to practice in the
same manner as he did prior to Lucas v. Harem.
ALLAN E. IDING
Wills-Pouring Over into Testamentary Trust of Another: A
mother and her son planned and drafted together her last will dated
May 2, 1946, and his will dated May 3, 1946. The draft of the latter will
was in existence on the date the former will was executed. According
to a trust provision in the mother's will, one-half of the trust assets were
left "to my son's trust estate, which is willed to charities including those
of my choosing."' She died testate on November 19, 1947. The son later
revoked his will and made a subsequent will dated February 14, 1958,
which omitted all charities. He died testate on January 4, 1959. On
September 11, 1959, the executors of the son's will filed a petition to
construe the final judgement in the mother's estate for the purpose of
determining whether any assets in the mother's estate should be inventoried in the son's estate. Held: the will by which testatrix made a beWis. 166, 75 N.W. 972 (1898). This statement of the standard of care has
been interpreted, however, as merely requiring ordinary skill and care as com-

27 100

monly possessed and exercised by attorneys in that jurisdiction. 45 A.L.R. 2d
12 (1956).
28It has been asserted that California physicians and surgeons have resorted to
the use of expensive precautions unnecessary for treatment but rather as a
legal precaution, have refrained from the use of new drugs, and have been
reluctant to employ novel techniques because of the impact of malpractice
litigation and high jury awards in that state. The California Malpractice Controversy, 9 STAN. L. REv. 731 (1956).
'Estate of Brandenburg, 13 Wis. 2d 217, 222, 108 N.W. 2d 374, 376 (1961).
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quest to "my son's trust estate, which is willed to charities including
those of my choosing,"'2 incorporated by reference the son's will dated
May 3, 1946, and the gifts to charity were not defeated by the son's
subsequent revocation of that will. Estate of Brandenburg, 13 Wis. 2d
217, 108 N.W. 2d 374 (1961).
The doctrine of incorporation by reference is recognized in the majority of jurisdictions in the United States. 3 Stated generally, the traditional doctrine as applied to wills is that:
A will, duly executed and witnessed according to statutory
requirements, may incorporate into itself by an appropriate reference a written paper or document which is in existence at the
time of the execution of the will, irrespective of whether such
document is one executed and attested as a will or whether it is
in and of itself a valid instrument, provided the document referred to is identified by clear and satisfactory proof. So incoreffect as part of the will and
porated, the extrinsic paper takes
4
is admitted to probate as such.
The rule requiring that an extrinsic document be in existence at the
time of execution of a will in order to be incorporated by reference is
solely for the purpose of identifying the document, and it need not be
executed prior to the will. 5 This general rule has been applied in the
case of a will wherein a bequest was made in trust and the terms 6of the
trust were indicated by reference to an extrinsic trust instrument.
Wisconsin case law on the subject of incorporating by reference an
unexecuted document has been sparse. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
previously held in Polak v. Polak that the making of mutual wills by
husband and wife, referring to a postnuptial agreement which was never
in fact executed, did not establish evidence of such an agreement so as
to deprive a divorce court of authority to divest the wife of realty conveyed to her by her husband shortly after their marriage.' The facts in
that case, however, revealed that there was no evidence of an existing
agreement between the parties prior to the execution of the will. In the
Brandenburg case the court seined to settle the issue that a document
need not be in existence in final form before it may be incorporated
into a will by reference. 8
2Ibid.

A.L.R. 2d 683 (1949); Skinner v. American Bible Society 92 Wis. 209, 65
N.W. 1037 (1896) ; Estate of Wells 184 Wis. 242, 199 N.W. 52 (1924).
4 57 Aii. JUR. WILLS §233, at 193 (1948).
5 Allday v. Cage, 148 S.W. 838 (1912).
6 Bemis v. Fletcher, 251 Mass. 178, 146. N.E. 277 (1925) ; Re Willey, 128 Cal. 1,
60 Pac. 471 (1900) ; Industrial Trust Co. v. Colt, 45 R.I. 334, 121 A. 426 (1923).
?Polak v. Polak, 248 Wis. 425, 430, 22 N.W. 2d 153, 155 (1946).
8 Supra note 1, at 226, 108 N.W. 2d at 379. The Wisconsin court quotes from 2
33

BOWL-PARKER: PAGE ON WILLS

§19.27 (1960):

"If a trust document to be incorporated into a will was in existence at
the time the will was executed, the fact that it was not signed or that
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The second problem the court had to decide was whether the son's
will of May 3, 1946, which included trust provisions for named charities could be incorporated by reference into the mother's will, even
though the son's later will in 1958 omitted the charitable trust provisions. In jurisdictions which permit both the making of an amendable
revocable trust and the incorporation of its terms into a will by reference, the mere possibility of an amendment or revocation of the trust
does not make the will void when the trust is thus incorporated, but the
assets passing under the will are administered according to the trust
termsY In a Massachusetts case, Bemis v. Fletcher,0 where there was a
bequest by the testatrix to those persons who should be appointed residuary trustees under her husband's will, the court held that the husband's
will was incorporated into the will of the testatrix but stated that it
need not consider what construction would be given to her will if her
husband had made another will, as this event did not happen." Thus
the theory of incorporation by reference would allow incorporation of
a revocable and amendable trust document only as it existed at the
time of execution of the will. This theory has forced attorneys to execute a codicil referring to the trust as amended after each amendment.
If the trust were revoked, it appears that the incorporation by reference
doctrine would not be effective, for there would be a bequest to a trust
no longer in existence. The mother in the Brandenburg case would not
have made a valid bequest if the son revoked his trust containing charities unless on the basis of a constructive trust.
Even though the Wisconsin Supreme Court could not sustain the
charitable bequests made by the mother by an application of the incorporation by reference doctrine, the court refused to allow them to fail
by reason of the son's revocation of his charitable trust. It impressed
the mother's property with a constructive trust for the benefit of the
residuary charitable beneficiaries named in her son's will of May 3,
1946. The court stated that where a person knowing that a testator by
giving him a devise or bequest intends it to be applied for the benefit
of another, and either expressly provides, or by his action at the time
implies that he will effectuate the testator's intention and the property is
left to him in the belief that such promise will be kept, the promisor will
be held as a trustee ex maleficio. 12 It was held in Brook v. Chappel that
such a trust "owes its validity not to the will or the declaration of the
testator, but to the fraud of the devisee. It belongs to a class in which
the trust had not been created by the transfer of property to the trustee
should not prevent the incorporation of the trust document into the will."
9 57 Am. Jun. WILLs §241 (1948) ; Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195,
58 N.E. 2d 381 (1944).
20 Bemis v. Fletcher, 251 Mass. 178, 146 N.E. 277 (1925).
" Id. 146 N.E. at 279.
12 Brook v. Chappell, 34 Wis. *405 (1874).
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the trust arises ex maleficio and in which equity turns the fraudulent
procurer of the legal title into a trustee to get at him."' 3 New York has
held that "if the devisee does not mean to act in accord with the declared expectation which underlies and induces the devise, he is bound
to say so, or his silent acquesience is otherwise a fraud."' 14 The rule is
founded on the principle that the devise would not have been given
unless the promise had been made, and hence the person is bound in
equity to keep it, as to violate it would be fraud."'15 This doctrine appears to apply only when the revocation or fraud comes after the death
of the testator. Case law gives no clear determination as to whether the
doctrine will apply if the revocation comes before the testator's death.
If in a Brandenburg fact situation the son revoked his will before the
mother's death, the mother would probably be held to have knowledge
of the revocation.
Although it appears that Wisconsin can sustain a bequest to charities
named in a testamentary trust created by another person, by invoking
the incorporation by reference and constructive trust doctrines, an analysis of Section 231.20516 indicates that Wisconsin will not incorporate
134 Id. at 415.

' Re O'Hara, 95 N.Y. 403 (1884), as cited in 66 A.L.R. 156, 162 (1930).
I5Amhurst College v. Ritch, 151 N.Y. 282, 45 N.E. 876, 887 (1897).
16 Wis. STAT. §231.205 (1959) : Life use by settlor of trusts; eligibility for bequests and devises; powers.
(1) Any instrument declaring or creating a trust, when otherwise valid, shall
not be held an invalid trust, or an attempted testamentary disposition, because it contains any of the following powers, whether exerciseable by
the settler or another or both:
(a) To revoke, alter, amend or modify any or all provisions of the trust.
(b) To exercise any power or option over any property transferred to or
held in the trust.
(c) To add to or withdraw from the trust all or any part thereof at one
time or at different times.
(d) To direct during the lifetime of the settlor or another, the persons
and organizations to whom or on behalf of whom the income shall
be paid or principal distributed.
(2) A trust otherwise valid, created by a written instrument, whether or not
it contains any or all of the powers specified in sub. (1), shall have existence independent of any will and be eligible to receive property bequeathed, devised or appointed by the settlor and others, whatever the
size or character of its corpus or the terms of the instrument, unless the
instrument specifically states otherwise. No reference to any such trust
in any will shall cause the trust assets to be included in the property
administered as part of the testators estate.
(3) Any or all of the powers listed in sub. (1) may be exercised without
affecting the validity of the trust, its nontestamentary character and its
independent existence and eligibility for the receipt of property bequeathed, devised and appointed to it, and the exercise of a power, under
sub. (1) (a) to amend, alter or modify the provisions of the instrument
shall be effective to change such provisions as to property devised, bequeathed or appointed by will to the trust even though the settlor's will is
not re-executed or republished after the exercise of such power.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed as altering or changing in any
way the existing law or rules of law relating to the rights of widows, the
taxation of transfers of property in trust, or trusts and wills other than
those specified in this section.
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by reference the terms of a prior living revocable amendable trust into
a will which adds to that trust by what is commonly called a pour-over
clause 11 By statutory provision the inter vivos trust shall have existence independent of any will and the courts will not incorporate into
wills the dispositive provisions of the living trust and thus make them
dispositive parts of the will. 8
The remaining question to be answered is whether Section 231.47,
enacted subsequent to the Brandenburg case may be applied to a comparable fact situation. Under the new statute the charitable bequest by
Arabelle S. Brandenburg would not be invalid because made to a trust
created or to be created under the will of another person. It would
seemingly appear that Section 231.47(1) has a wider application than
the incorporation by reference doctrine as no document at all need to be
in existence showing her son's bequest to charities at the time that
Arabelle S. Brandenburg executed her will. However, under the new
statute her son's will must have been executed (or was last modified
with respect to the terms and conditions of his charitable trust) prior
to his mother's death. The son's will in the principal case was executed
before his mother's death and was later revoked after his mother's
death. However, the son's will could not be admitted to probate prior
to, or within two years after his mother's death as required by Section
231.47(1), as he did not die until 12 years after the mother's death.
(5) This section shall be applicable to trusts created and wills executed both
before and after May 14, 1955 by persons who are living on or after May
14, 1955.

(6) Any amendment, alteration or modification of a trust subject to this section shall be effective to change the provisions thereof as to property devised, bequeathed or appointed by will to the trust even though the will is
not re-executed or republished after the effective date of the amendment,

alteration, or modification, if the settlor or testator is alive on or after
July 26, 1957.

11 Estate of Steck, 275 Wis. 290, 81 N.W. 2d 729 (1957). The court sustained a

living trust against the contention of the widow that the trust was testamentary
in part because it was tied in with the will by a pour-over clause which bequeathed the residue of the estate of the trustee.
Is Supra note 16, at §231.205 (2).
29 LAWS OF WIs., ch. 403 (1961), Wis. STAT. §231.47: Devises and Bequests to
Testamentary Trusts: (1) A devise or bequest otherwise valid shall not be
held invalid because made to a trust created or to be created under the will
of another person, if the will of such other person was executed (or was last
modified with respect to the terms and conditions of such trust) prior to the
death of the person making the devise or bequest and such other person's will
is admitted to probate prior to, or within 2 years after, the death of the
person making the devise or bequest. All such devises and bequests, when
accepted, shall be added to the trust to which they were devised or bequeathed
and be administered as part thereof. (2) If such a devise or bequest is not
accepted or if no will of such other person which meets the conditions spedfled in sub. (1) is admitted to probate within the period therein limited, and
if the will containing such devise or bequest makes no alternate disposition of
the property so devised or bequeathed, the will containing such devise or bequest shall be construed to 4reate a trust upon the terms and conditions contained in the document or documents constituing the will of such other person
as of the date of death of the person making the devise or bequest.
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So under the statute the mother's bequest could not be added to the
son's trust and be administered as part of that trust even if it were in
existence when he died. But under Section 231.47(2) even though the
mother's bequest is not accepted, or the son's will is not admitted to
probate within the period limited in Section 231.47(1) and the mother's
will contained no alternate disposition of the property, her will shall be
construed to create a trust upon the terms and conditions contained in
the will of her son as of the date of her own death. As the son's will
containing charitable bequests was not revoked as of the time of the
mother's death, the mother's testamentary bequest would be valid under
Section 231.47(2). Had the son revoked his will before his mother's
death, the bequest by the mother would not have been valid under the
statute because there would be no will of the son in existence at the
time of the mother's death from which a trust could be construed.
A final analysis of Section 231.47 leads to the conclusions that this
section controls devises and bequests to testamentary trusts and does
away with the common law doctrine of incorporation by reference.
Under the facts of the Brandenburg case a constructive trust will be
invoked to sustain the mother's bequest only if the son has not revoked
his will including charitable provisions before the mother's death; and
if the son revokes his will before the mother's death, the mother's bequest will fall outside the protection of the statute.
DENNIS LINDNER

Constitutional Law-Freedom of Silence-Admission to the Bar:
On May 6, 1957, the United States Supreme Court decided the first
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California case.' Prior to that time Raphael
Konigsberg, having successfully passed the California bar examination,
had applied for certification for bar membership. Under California law
the California Supreme Court may admit to the practice of law any
applicant whose qualifications have been certified to it by the California
Committee of Bar Examiners.' The Committee declined to certify
Konigsberg on the ground that at the Committee hearings Konigsberg
refused to answer questions relating to his membership in the Communist Party. 3 At the hearings he had stated unequivocally his disbelief in
violent overthrow of government and had stated that he had never
knowingly been a member of any organization which advocated such
action. He further submitted witnesses to substantiate his good character. He would not, however, answer questions regarding his present or
1353 U.S. 252 (1957).
2Cal.

Bus. & Prof. Code 6064.
3 No person may be certified "who advocates the overthrow of the Government

of the United States or of this state by force, violence or other unconstitutional means." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6064.1.

